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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself as a critically sick patient who has
just checked into a large Eastern Medical Center. Right
before undergoing surgery, your doctor sits down and logs
onto the computer to review your record. The only problem
is that your record is nowhere to be found, and there is no
trace of what happened to it. A computer "virus" has
attacked the system. After rebuilding your medical record,
getting the medical care that you needed and recovering, you
finally return to work around Christmas time. As you log on
to the computer to check the messages that have piled up,
you notice that the system is severely overloaded. A type
of computer chain-letter has taken over the system in only a
couple of hours. Both of these events actually have
happened. [Marb88]
One of the problems with the use of computers is the
lack of security built into them. It is fairly easy to
control the flow of classified paper, but how is the
classified computer data safeguarded? To the Department of
Defense (DoD) , this presents a real problem, and one that is
drawing increasingly close scrutiny.
Traditionally, computer security has been an
afterthought to system designers whose main concerns are the
efficiency of operation and the budget. This attitude has
degraded the performance of systems, caused increased costs,
and systems to be delivered late when the security module
had to be added. If the designers of the systems had
considered the security requirements in the beginning, most
of these problems could have been avoided. [Tayl88]
A. THE ENVIRONMENT
Computer security is the art of compromise. The only
truly secure computer is one that is turned off and in a
locked and shielded room. The computer which is easiest to
use places no limits on the activities of a user, authorized
or not. The most efficient computer, in terms of
throughput, does no checking for authorization to do an
operation, it just does it. It is the system designer's job
to hammer out a compromise between security, usability and
efficiency.
The security policy of an organization determines how
much security is compromised in order to achieve more
efficient operation of the system. The security policy is
determined by the security requirements of the organization.
If the principle function of the organization is to count
sheets and pillow cases, usability and throughput are more
important than security. At an intelligence center the
opposite will be true. While these are the two extremes
(therefore easily lending themselves to a particular
security policy implementation) , what about the average
military installation? It is harder to develop and maintain
a coherent computer security policy when the users and the
designers of the system themselves do not have a firm grasp
on the security requirements of the organization. It is
those systems that are provided to indecisive and often
unenlightened users that give computer security a bad name.
The reason is that very often security has been an
afterthought and usually, therefore, inefficient,
cumbersome, resented, and widely ignored.
The security goal of all computer systems is to provide
access to authorized users while denying access to
unauthorized users. A secure system is only secure with
respect to the security policy of the organization. DoD
defines a secure system as one that:
...will control, through use of specific security
features, access to information such that only properly
authorized individuals, or processes operating on their
behalf, will have access to read, write, create, or delete
information. [DoDs85]
While this definition gives us an idea what a secure system
is, it does not say how one is to be implemented. A more
rigorous definition of a secure computer will be developed
in the next chapter.
B . GOAL
It is the goal of this thesis to combine the security
aspect of computers with the growing field of parallel
processing; having two or more programs running at the same
time and communicating among themselves. The security will
have to allow for a multilevel secure process. A multilevel
secure process is a program that interacts with the security
policy at different levels and does not violate it. Since
security was a prime consideration from the beginning of the
development process, the parallel multilevel secure process
is both easy to use and efficient. Each of the processes is
a simulated electronic mail network node. The system will
simulate a network running on a trusted computer base. This
served to investigate the use of interprocess communications
and trusted computers in a multilevel secure environment.
C. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II presents a brief rational for the
consideration of the systems approach to security of a
system. The first section of the chapter is a brief history
of computer security. Also in the second chapter the
concepts of "Secure Computer" and "Security Kernel" are
introduced. The next section is an overview of the Gemini
trusted computer base and GEMSOS, its operating system.
This section is a condensation of the "System Overview"
published by Gemini computers. The final section of the
chapter contains some information on other secure systems,
both implemented and theoretical.
Chapter III deals with eventcounts and sequences. These
provide a means for processes to communicate with each other
during execution. The Gemini computer implements these in a
secure environment which is a little more complex than
normal
.
Chapter IV provides a description of the model and
implementation of the secure mail system. A complete
description of the modules is provided, along with
justification for some of the implementation choices that
were made during development.
The final chapter, Chapter V, list the conclusions and
provides recommendations for further study and research.
II. INTRODUCTION TO SECURE COMPUTERS
A. HISTORY
When Charles Babbage first developed his mechanical
analytical engine in the early nineteenth century, it was a
single user—single process machine. Security meant simply
keeping it locked up away from physical harm. One person
could run only one process at a time and that person had to
be in the same physical location as the computer to use it,
so physical protection was all that was required.
As technology advanced, the data processed on computers
became more sensitive and the cost of the machines
increased, the means of physical protection became more
elaborate. The fact remained, however, that the only
protection needed to enforce computer security was physical.
Very little thought went into having to place a security
device within the computer itself. To this day the primary
emphasis in security remains physical; that is, if you
cannot get to the computer, you can not do any harm to the
machine or the information stored in it. This eliminates
most of the security threats from outsiders. The threat
from insiders, people who are authorized access to the
computer, remains.
Computers were developed which were able to do more than
one process at a time, multiprocessing allowed the user to
have several processes loaded on the system, although only
one process was executing at any given moment. The advent
of multiprocessing meant that several users could gain
access to the system and run different programs at the same
time. This fact, combined with the use of remote
peripherals (which allowed users who were not in the same
physical location as the computer to use it) , created the
need for a new means of access control . These two
developments took the computer out of the exclusive control,
both physically and operationally, of a few trusted
operators and gave rise to the need for additional security
measures. It was no longer sufficient to provide physical
security; a form of logical security was needed. Changes
had to be made in operating system design to include a means
of verifying the person logging on had authorization to
access the system.
The user name and password mechanism was designed to
allow only certain people, i.e., the "authorized users,"
access to the system. When a user wants to gain access to
the machine, he has to first input his user identification
(userid) and a secret password that is known only to himself
and the System Security Manager (SSM) . These two entries
are verified in a table of authorized users. If they are
found and are correct, access is granted; if not, access is
denied.
The userid and password system can be extended to
include not only the computer, but also to certain sets of
programs and data files within the computer. This system
limits direct access by the user to only those items to
which he has been granted access authorization by the SSM.
These systems are not fool-proof, however. There is a set
of utilities, such as text editors and file managers, to
which all users have access. One of these programs could be
modified such that when it executed, it would copy a legally
accessed, protected data file into an unauthorized and
unprotected data file. This type of modification to a
program creates what is known as a "Trojan Horse" program.
In addition to its intended function, such a program
performs unauthorized hidden functions, usually undetected.
[Beob85]
A classic Trojan Horse program was written around 1976
at Heriot-Watt University, United Kingdom. A student wrote
a program that simulated a system crash followed by a login
sequence. He then left the program out on the system for
other users to try and run. When the unsuspecting user ran
the program the system appeared to crash and the user then
signed on. The program recorded the userid and password in
a disk file for later use by the author. [Norm83]
A derivation of the Trojan Horse is the "virus" program.
This program functions such that every time the user
executes the program in which the virus is embedded, the
virus is able to embed itself in yet another program until
the entire system is infected [Beob85] . An example of this
phenomenon would be a program that appends itself to the end
of another program and in turn deletes the program in which
it is embedded. Eventually, all of the programs will have
been infected and deleted.
The user identification and password system can do
nothing to stop these two problems. Since the "authorized
user" is the one running the infected program, his actions
are entirely legal—the results of his actions, even though
they may be unintentional and unknown to him, are not legal
or authorized. To combat the use of "Trojan Horses" and
"viruses," a new method of computer resource security had to
be developed. [Beob85]
The concept of multitasking of the computer created a
special kind of problem, namely, "How to separate two
processes that require different levels of security?" For
the most part, this was handled by limiting the system to
one classification at a time, the so called "single level"
security. Whenever the classification of the jobs changes
the machine has to be purged of all data to ensure there is
no residual classified information left on the machine. One
of the major drawbacks to this system is that one user
processing a classified job will cause all unclassified jobs
to wait until the classified job is done and the system has
been sanitized. This was clearly a waste of computer
resources.
As part of the research to deal with these security
issues, the concept of a "Security Kernel" (hereafter
referred to as just kernel) , was developed. This concept is
the main focus of this thesis. As the DoD becomes more and
more computerized, emphasis must be placed on the security
aspects of computer systems during the entire system life
cycle. Computer security cannot simply be added as an
afterthought software package.
B. COVERT CHANNELS
The Trojan Horse programs require a means to transfer
information from the authorized user to the perpetrator's
desired destination. Most of these information paths can be
closed, or reduced, by the use of the reference monitor
[Ames73]. However, there are ways to transfer information
from one process to another that do not use normal data
transfer means. This leakage of data between programs that
use data paths not intended for information transfer are
called covert channels [Lamp73]. All computer systems have
an abundance of covert channels, it is only the secure
systems that are concerned with eliminating them.
The damage done by the channel is a function of its
bandwidth. The bandwidth is the measure of bits per unit
time that are passed though the channel per unit time. The
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higher the bandwidth, the more damaging the channel is to
the security policy of the system.
While there are many different specific types of covert
channels, they can be grouped into two general classes,
storage and timing channels. A storage channel is one that
causes an object to be written and another process can
observe some aspect of that action. A timing channel uses a
timing mechanism to observe the effect on the system by some
process. [Gass88]
Storage channels can be grouped into three subclasses.
The first class is the object's existence. This simply
tells the user if an object exists or not. An example would
be an attempted access to a file and the message "permission
denied" is returned by the system. In this manner we can
tell the file exists. The second type, object attributes,
can give us even more specific data on the object. This can
be done by reading an object's header and reading the
attributes. The value of attributes that are stored in the
header may be real or placed there by a Trojan Horse and
used for communication. The final type of storage channel
is the shared resource channel. This channel communicate
more on the status of the system rather then on one
particular process. A printer spooler that has a finite
number of jobs can be monitored as a covert channel; this
would indicate the status of the print queue at any given
moment . [ Gass8 8
]
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The other general type of covert channel is the timing
channel. This type of channel requires access to a timer in
order to operate. The clock can be provided by the system,
i.e., a real time clock, or by the program, i.e., a timing
loop. From the passage of time it is possible for the
program to determine the passage between two events. An
example of this is the request for access to a file and
denial of access. The programmer knows that it takes X
amount of time for the system to determine that it does not
exist and Y to determine that access is denied. [Gass88]
Of the two types of channels, the timing channel is
harder to control. There are no formal techniques for
finding them and they are very difficult to detect and
correct. The storage channel's bandwidth can be reduced by
strictly enforcing the security models and the elimination
of shared resources. [Gass88]
C. SECURITY KERNELS
As the problem of covert channels was brought to light,
a method to deal with them had to be developed. The most
elementary solution was to provide a separate machine for
every level, or security classification, of processing.
This was also one of the most expensive solutions since the
computer was not being used to the fullest extent possible
and it was difficult to share the data between machines.
This idea evolved into the concept of having the machine
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appear to each user as though it were dedicated to his
particular level of processing.
This concept required the establishment of several
different security levels within the machine itself.
Providing these various levels of security were extensions
of the password and userid system. The user had his access
authorization checked at a finer level, thereby adding an
extra layer of security to the system. An example of this
is requiring the user to specify a password to access an
object. This method of access control proved to have the
same drawbacks as the login password—it created an
environment, although smaller, in which the user access
could be exploited. As was shown in a preceding section,
access control of the environment can be circumvented by the
Trojan horse or virus.
The environment created by use of access controls
provides only a means to check the user's authorization to
access the data, which is insufficient to stop the Trojan
horse attack. We must also examine his authorization to
modify, delete and write to the data storage location. In
order to reduce the bandwidth of the covert channels, the
authorization to write and the destination of the data must
be validated each time the user writes his data. Simply
put, every reference to any information must be checked and
authorized. This is the basic concept behind the idea of a
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Figure 1. The Reference Monitor
Before we go any further, some terms have to be defined
that will be used throughout the rest of this thesis. All
active processes, be they users, executing jobs, or anything
else which makes a reference to data, are termed subjects.
An object is a passive element, such as a data file, program
file, terminal device, or storage device, which contains the
data elements of the system. When a program is called, it
transitions from an object—a passive program file, to a
subject—an active process in the system.
Nondiscretionary security is the mandatory security that
is enforced on all users. It is based strictly on the
individual's security clearance. Discretionary security is
the policy that limits access to those who have the need to
know. A security policy is the organization's guiding
principle when it comes to accessing information. This can
be discretionary—relying strictly on the subject's need to
know—or nondiscretionary—based on the subject's level of
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trust, which is his security clearance. Most organizations,
like the U.S. military, have a policy that is a combination
of both of these. A clearance and a need to know are both
required to gain access to objects. With reference to this
security policy, we can classify computers as trusted or
not. A trusted computer is one which can be relied on to
enforce the organization's security policy.
When a subject references an object, the reference
monitor must approve the transaction. This includes not
only reading the data in a file, but writing the data out as
well. Note that this reduces the effectiveness of the
storage covert channels by controlling all access to the
data. The Trojan Horse program is detected when it tries to
write the data into an unauthorized file, and the virus is
diagnosed when it attempts to embed itself where it is not
allowed.
Some of the more successful implementations of a trusted
computer use the security kernel [Land73]. The security
kernel is defined as the hardware and software required to
carry out the reference monitor concept. The kernel assumes
control over a small subset of the functions which are
normally part of the operating system. [Ames7 3]
The kernel is placed between the operating system and
the hardware. The implementation of the kernel is of vital
concern to the design of the system. Since every data
reference must be validated, a significant amount of
15
computer time is spent in the kernel. If the kernel is
implemented in software the performance will suffer, but the
system will be flexible. A hardware kernel will run fast
but it will be very difficult to modify. As stated in the
introduction, security is the art of compromise. As a
result, the kernel should be implemented partially in both.
Figure 2 shows a normal system configuration and Figure 3












Figure 2 . A Standard Operating System
A trusted process, as shown in Figure 3, is one that can
circumvent the security built into the kernel. While it can
sidestep the built in security, it is trusted not to violate























Figure 3. An Operating System using a Security Kernel
critical to the efficient operation of the system. A
typical trusted process allows the SSM to down-grade a
classified file.
Implementing the kernel as a subset of the operating
system solves the problem of size and complexity associated
with large programs. This implementation concept is
integral to the three design criteria of secure computers
(completeness, isolation, and verifiability) . The size of
the kernel has a direct impact on the designer's ability to
prove that each of the design criteria hold.
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The first of these, completeness of the reference
monitor—requires that all access to the objects be made
through the kernel. The second concept, the isolation of
the kernel, ensures that the monitor is tamper-proof.
Isolation of the kernel is usually achieved by implementing
the monitor in a mixture of hardware and inaccessible system
software. The third concept is that of verifiability of the
reference monitor. This requirement states that the
designer of the system must be able to prove that the
monitor enforces the security policy for which it was
designed.
The completeness and verifiability of the reference
monitor can be attributed to small size of the kernel. Due
to the small size, it is possible to do exhaustive testing
and proof of correctness to prove the correctness of the
kernel. An example of the small size of the kernel would
be one of the first security kernels developed by The Mitre
Corporation in 1974. It consisted of less than 20 primitive
subroutines and was written in fewer than 1000 high level
language statements. [Ames7 3]
The work in security kernels was based mostly on the
development of the Bell and LaPadula model [Ames73]. This
model is the most widely accepted of the systems that have
been built thus far for use within DoD. The model is based
on the "simple security condition" in which a subject at a
given security level has the ability to access only objects
18
at an equal or lower security level. Objects of a higher
classification would be inaccessible; in other words, no
"read up" is possible.
The *-property (pronounced "star-property") , is just the
opposite of the simple security condition. Subjects can
only write to objects that are higher or equal
classification, no "write down" is allowed. Figure 4










Figure 4. The Bell and LaPadula Model
An exception to the two properties is a trusted process,
in which subjects are authorized to cross some of the
security boundaries of the system provided that the security
policy of the system is not violated.
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D. SECURE COMPUTERS
The DoD realized there must be some standardization in
the definitions and criteria of secure computers. As a
result of this the DoD Computer Security Center (DoDSCS)
published the DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria, CSC-STD-001-83 , otherwise known as the "Orange
Book" (the color of its cover) [DoDs85] . This document sets
forth six fundamental requirements that a trusted, or
secure, computer must provide. In addition to the
requirements, four divisions and several subclasses are
defined to provide a standard bench mark for the evaluation
and rating of the systems. [DoDS85]
The six requirements are broken down into two
categories. The first, which contains the first two
requirements, deals with the policy that is being
implemented. The remaining four requirements cover what the
system must furnish to ensure controlled access to data.
The following is a summary of the requirements:
Policy Requirements
Requirement One. Security Policy—there must be an
explicit and well-defined security policy enforced by the
system.
Requirement Two. Marking—Access Control Labels must
be associated with objects.
Accountability Requirements
Requirement three. Identification—Individual
subjects must be identified.
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Requirement Four. Accountability—Audit information
must be selectively kept and protected so that actions
affecting security can be traced to the responsible party.
Requirement Five. Assurance—the computer system must
contain hardware/software mechanisms that can be
independently evaluated to provide sufficient assurance
that the system enforces requirements one through four
above
.
Requirement Six. Continuous Protection—the trusted
mechanisms that enforce these basic requirements must be
continuously protected against tampering and/or
unauthorized changes. [DoDS85]
These six basic requirements provide the foundation of
the four security divisions. The divisions are labeled
alphabetically, in decreasing order of assurance of the
security enforcement, D being the least credible and A
providing the most complete security mechanisms. Each class
includes all of the requirements for the lower classes.
Division D has only one class. A division D machine is
one that has been tested but has failed to meet any the
requirements of a higher class. Minimal protection is
provided by this class.
Discretionary protection is provided by both class CI
and C2 . The users, processes and other active entities are
held accountable for the actions by required audit
capabilities. A CI system must control access between named
users and named objects. The users of the system shall be
able to specificy and control the access to an object.
Before a user gains access to the system he must identify
himself and authenticate his identity. All functions of the
TCB must be protected from tampering and be able to be
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periodically validated to ensure correct operation. The CI
system shall be documented and tested to ensure that the
documentation agrees with the implementation. A CI system
should only be used when all users are processing the same
level of data.
A class C2 system has a finer granularity on the
discretionary access control than CI, because it holds the
individual responsible for his actions by means of login
procedures, auditing of security-relevant events and the
isolation of resources. When a system assigns a storage
resources it must first verify that the unauthorized data
has been purged. The testing process for a class C2 system
must include a search for obvious security related flaws in
the system.
Division B, mandatory protection, has the largest number
(three) of classes. Division B enforces a set of mandatory
access controls through the use of sensitivity labels that
are associated with the data in the system. The security
labels include both machine and human readable formats. The
developer of the system must be able to provide the
specification of the system and prove that the TCB
implements the reference monitor concept. A TCB that has
been rated as class Bl must provide an informal statement of
security policy model, data labeling, and mandatory access
control over named entities in the system. Any change to
the security labels or overrides of the system must be
22
auditable and done by an accountable individual. Any known
bugs in the system must be removed before certification of
the system. Documentation must be provided that includes
the maintenance and user changes to the TCB.
A B2 system requires that the security policy be
formalized and extended to include both discretionary and
nondiscretionary controls over all entities of the system.
The system must provide a trusted path from the user to the
TCB for user login and authentication. All physical devices
on a B2 system must have a minimum and maximum security
level. The process isolation requirement for class B2
requires that each process contains it own address space
under TCB control. A detailed search for covert channels is
mandated in a B2 system and the bandwidth of the channel
must be computed. The TCB must be structured in such a way
as to provide protection critical and nonprotection critical
elements in the system. A configuration management system
must be put in place to ensure consistency between the TCB
and the documentation. The developer of a B2 system must
ensure that the formal model used and defined in the
descriptive top-level specification is consistent with the
TCB.
A system that has achieved a B3 classification makes use
of security domains to aid in its high resistance to
penetration. The B3 rated TCB must completely implement the
reference monitor concept, be tamperproof and small enough
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to be thoroughly analyzed and tested. A logically isolated
and distinguishable trusted path must be provided between
the user and the TCB which can be activated by the user or
the TCB. In the event of system failure, a means to provide
a trusted recovery, one that does not compromise the
security of the system, must be in place. The coding of a
B3 TCB must be done using modern software engineering
techniques. The testing of the TCB must find no design
flaws, show that few correctable implementation -flaws exist
and that there is cause to believe that few flaws remain.
Current technology allows for only one class within the
A division, Al. While the system may be functionally the
same as a class B3 system, the amount of analysis, formal
design specifications, and verification methods result in a
high degree of credibility that the TCB is correctly
implemented and that the hardware implements the formal
specification. The formal specification must contain a top
level specification of each of the modules in the model, a
formal model of the security policy, and a mathematical
proof proving its correctness. The existence of covert
channels must be identified, analyzed, and their existence
justified by formal means.
The purpose of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria is to provide guidance to both the user and the
vendor. It is a service to the user by aiding in the
acquisition process. By having a reference document, the
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user can specify a class of protection that he needs,
thereby eliminating the need for the development of his own
security classification system. The document provides a
service to the vendor by listing those requirements the
government views as important. It also gives the vendor the
evaluation criteria so that he can design and build systems
that will have a market.
E. THE GEMINI COMPUTER AND GEMSOS
This section serves as a brief overview of the Gemini
Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base, hereafter referred to
as the computer, TCB or system. This is essentially a
synopsis of the salient points contained in [Gemi84], which
is available from Gemini computers.
The system was designed from the ground up to be
certified as a B3 class machine with the possibility of
eventual Al rating. In order to accomplish this, the system
uses some of the latest microprocessor and software
technology. Some of the major features of the system
include:
1. Use of the Intel IEEE standard 796 Multibus allowing
for third party expansion boards.
2. Up to eight iAPX286 (80286) microprocessors with up to
two megabytes of local memory.
3. Global shared memory of up to eight megabytes.
4. Nonvolatile memory used to store passwords, encryption
keys and other security related data.
5. Up to 48 RS-232 serial communication ports.
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6. A mix of four disk drives to include Winchester hard
disks and floppy disk drives.
7. Real time calendar clock.
8. Self-hosting software development environment.
9. Data encryption using the NBS standard DES algorithm.
[Gemi85]
A graphic representation of the system's architecture is
contained in Figure 5. The design of the computer provides
for a flexible and expandable system capable of growth and
customization to the desired application.
1 . Resource Management
One of the major functions of any computer's
operating system is that of resource management. The Gemini
Secure Operating System (GEMSOS) is no exception to this
rule. GEMSOS is structured as a kernelized operating
system, and as such the system calls are made as procedural
calls to the kernel. By providing a conceptually simpler
operating system, the resource management calls have been
divided into three major areas: segments, process and
device management. The specifics of the individual calls
can be found in the GEMSOS interface routines provided by
Gemini Computers with each compiler; we will deal only in a
high level of abstraction.
GEMSOS does not use files as thought of in a
conventional sense, but rather makes use of a uniquely
identified logical object called a segment. All code and




















































* Indicates the minimum and maximum number of devices
or expansion boards of this type
Figure 5. The Gemini TCB Architecture
the code from the data segments it is possible to ensure the
static nature of the code by making the code segment read
only. A pair of functions allows the system to assign a
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local temporary identification to a segment and then to
release it. Through the use of the "swap-in" and "swap-out"
kernel calls, it is possible to bring a segment into memory
where the data can be accessed. Secondary storage (disk
drives) is divided into a series of volumes. Each of the
volumes can be thought of as a collection of segments. The
volumes, just like the segments, contain security labels
that reflect the security classification of the data stored
in them. The database of segments is managed by a segment
manager which keeps track of all segments known to a process
though the use of a "Known Segment Table." It is this
segment manager that acts as the reference monitor by
controlling data access. More specifics about the kernel
calls used in this thesis can be found in [Gemi86b]
.
Process management is the second major area of
concern. Most modern computer systems are capable of
supporting multiprogramming (having more than one job in
memory at a time on a single CPU) and multiprocessing
(executing more than one process at the same time on
multiple CPUs) ; the Gemini system is no exception. GEMSOS
requires that the processes are run on the same physical CPU
that they are created on at run time. This forces the
process to share the CPU with other executing processes. To
minimize bus contention, each process's code, stack, and
data segments are loaded in the processor's local memory
thereby improving the system throughput. In order for two
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asynchronous processes to communicate with each other, Reed
and Kanodia's eventcounts and sequencers [Reed79] are used
(this will be covered in more detail in the next chapter)
.
The time sharing of the CPU uses a very simple algorithm: a
process runs until it blocks, at which time it is swapped
out and the next pending process is swapped in. In order to
keep the kernel code as simple as possible, no effort is
made to determine if deadlock exists.
The desire to keep the kernel code as small as
possible led to the philosophy for device management that
Gemini used in designing the system. This approach is to
handle each I/O function at the application level by the
application programmer, thereby making use of part of the
segment and process manager subsystems. While this approach
makes the verification of the security system easier, it
makes the development of application programs considerably
more difficult than in a "normal" programming environment.
The device management system is based on the requirement
that each of the I/O peripheral controllers are themselves
processes. These processes are activated by a procedural
call at the application level and accomplish the required
I/O synchronization and transfer at a lower level. The
involvement of the kernel with I/O is minimal. It is
limited to the attachment and detachment of the device to
the process, which makes it possible to reduce the amount of
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involvement of the kernel in the process, thereby increasing
throughput.
The resource management within GEMSOS is highly
dependent on the hardware of the system. This follows
directly from the fact the system was designed from the
ground up to be a secure system.
2. GEMSOS Architecture
GEMSOS uses a ring-based protection system, similar
to the Multics operating system [Corb65] . The rings are
referred to as Ring 0, the most privileged, through Ring 3,
the least privileged. Rings and 1 implement the
Bell-LaPadula model. Ring contains the distributed kernel
that implements the nondiscretionary part of the model.
Ring 1 contains the supervisor that provides the
discretionary part of the model. These first two rings make
up the reference monitor. Rings 2 and 3 are outside the
security perimeter of the system and are used for nonsecure
processes. GEMSOS provides a series of kernel calls to
allow a process to communicate across different rings.
Each entity within GEMSOS is assigned a security
label. From this label it is possible to determine the
level of compromise and integrity properties of the subject
or object. Figure 6 contains a brief statement of these two
properties as contained in [Gemi84]. When entity A's access
class is a superset of entity B's access class, A's access
class is said to dominate B's access class.
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Compromise Properties:
1) If a subject has "observe" access to an object, the compromise
&ccettB component of the subject must dominate the compromise access
component of the object.
2) If a subject has "modify" access to an object, the compromise
access component of the object must dominate the compromise access
component of the subject.
Integrity Properties:
1) If a subject has "modify" access to an object, the integrity
access component of the subject must dominate the integrity access
component of the object.
2) If a subject has "observe" access to an object, the integrity
access component of the object must dominate the Integrity access
component of the subject.
Figure 6. Compromise and Integrity Properties
The access class of the entities determines what
type of device they can interact with. This is made more
complex by the fact the GEMSOS allows single and multilevel
subjects. These are subjects that can access objects over a
contiguous range of security levels. This is similar to a
multilevel device, one that can be attached to different
level subjects. GEMSOS also supports single level devices.





This section contains some of the background and
procedures required for a programmer to develop applications
within GEMSOS. The steps taken apply to all programming
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Single Level Devices:
1) To receive ("read") inforaation:
Process aaxiaua coaproaise >= Device ainiaua coaproaise
Device aaxiaua integrity >= Process ainiaua integrity
2) To send ("write" > information:
Device aaxiaua coaproaise >= Process ainiaua coaproaise
Process aaxiaua integrity >= Device minimua integrity
Multilevel Devices:
1) To receive ("read") information:
Process aaxiaua coaproaise >= Device aaxinua coaproaise
Device ainiaua integrity >= Process ainiaua integrity
2) To send ("write") inforaation:
Device ainiaua coaproaise >= Process ainiaua compromise
Process maxiaua integrity >= Device aaxiaua integrity
Figure 7. Properties of Single/Multi Level Devices
languages supported by the Gemini computer. For further
guidance the reader should refer to [Gemi86b] and [Gemi86c]
.
GEMSOS is capable of hosting an operating system
(having another operating system run between GEMSOS and the
applications) . Currently this is limited to CP/M-86, but
discussions with Gemini personnel indicate that GEMSOS might
soon be able to host the UNIX operating system as well
[Tao88]. The ability to have a hosted, widely-used
operating system is critical to the application development
process, allowing users to run some of the commercially
available programming languages such as Pascal MT+,
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JANUS/ADA, PL/1, C, and Fortran. This reduces the amount of
code required to be included within GEMSOS by having the
hosted operating system handle the development process.
There are special routines that are provided by Gemini
computers to create the operating system and kernel calls to
GEMSOS for the compiled code. These special routines allow
the user to write programs which do not require the hosted
operating system but can place service calls directly to
GEMSOS. These service calls are similar to normal
procedural calls for the language in which the application
is written.
One of the advantages of having CP/M as a hosted
operating system is that GEMSOS allows concurrent processing
without depending on concurrent programming languages. The
programs can be developed under CP/M and then run in GEMSOS
as concurrent programs. For example, PASCAL MT+ does not
have the ability to effect interprocess communication but,
with functions provided by GEMSOS, it is possible to use the
eventcounts and sequencers to achieve the communication.
The coding, compilation, and linking of an
application is done in a manner similar to what is done in a
standard CP/M environment. The coding is a little more
complex because of the security constraints involved. The
debugging of the system is radically different in that the
system must be sysgened (defined later) and then booted
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under GEMSOS. This by itself adds a tremendous amount of
time to the application development process.
One of the most difficult concepts that the
application developer faces is the structure of the GEMSOS
hierarchical storage system. As stated previously, GEMSOS
does not support a file and directory structure, but rather
a hierarchical segment ordering where each of the segments
has a unique name, its access path. The segment naming
process follows a strict hierarchical method that is shown
in Figure 8. The segment numbers are assigned in a CP/M
submit file. This file is then used as the source input for
the sysgen process, which builds the structure on the




The Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base
provides a flexible, cutting edge of technology computer
system to be used in an environment where security is a key
consideration. While the system is very capable, it is
still a first generation TCB, and like many other products
on the leading edge it is not user friendly. If the
application that is being developed does not require the




































F. OTHER SECURE SYSTEMS
The Gemini TCB was designed from the start to be a
secure computer. [Land7 3] provides a good overview of some
other systems that have been completed and some that are
still under development. Many of these systems are
extensions to existing software or hardware.
Two operating systems seem to be the favorites for the
software implementation of the security models, Multics and
Unix. Multics [Corb65] is a logical choice for the
conversion since its design is based upon the ring privilege
concept, the inner rings are more privileged than the outer
rings. By establishing a few well-defined gates it is
possible to control the flow of information between the
rings. The use of segmented memory, where each file is a
segment, allows the inclusion of a header to keep track of
the ring parameters. Each segment has read, write and
execute bits that act in conjunction with the ring
parameters to aid in the enforcement of the security policy.
The other popular operating system to enhance is Unix
[Ritc74]. In native, or unenhanced Unix the protection
system is based on the file system and the user domains.
Each of the files has read, write and execute bits for the
owner, group, and world. This provides a basic data access
security. One of the better known modifications was the
UCLA data secure Unix. In this implementation, the
Bell-LaPadula model is enforced by a module running outside
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the kernel. The resulting system was implemented on a
PDP-11 and ran very slowly [Land73].
A different approach was taken by Honeywell for
development of the Honeywell Secure Communications Processor
(SCOMP) [Hone84]. To build this system, a standard
minicomputer, the Honeywell DPS 6, was modified by the
replacement of the central processor unit, the memory
management unit and the addition of a security protection
module. SCOMP uses a kernelized operating system based on
Multics. This system has been certified by DoDSCS to meet
all the requirements for the Al level.
Computer security, especially security kernels, was a
major research area in academia during the early eighties.
As the research started to yield implementable systems,
fewer papers were published to avoid giving away trade
secrets and benefiting competitors in the security market
place.
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III. EVENTCOUNTS AND SEQUENCERS
Whenever a computer system has more than one process
executing concurrently, a process management system is
required. When the processes are independent of each other,
the operating system's scheduler and process swapping
mechanism provides the required control. In a computer
system that allows the processes to communicate, share code,
or share data during execution, a means to achieve process
synchronization and communication is required.
There are several means to achieve the synchronization
necessary for the correct process execution. Some of the
more common methods (semaphores and monitors) are primarily
designed to provide mutual exclusion to a critical section
of code (only one process can execute at a time) or the
access to a data structure. This chapter will explore a
different form of synchronizing mechanism that is used by
GEMSOS, eventcounts and sequencers. This mechanism to
control the sequencing of processes was developed by Reed
and Kanodia [Reed79].
A. EVENTCOUNTS
An eventcount is an increasing unbounded integer that
keeps track of the number of events that have occurred so
far in the system. This concept is very similar to
Lamport's "logical clock" [Lamp78]. It is up to the
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programmer to determine what constitutes an event; it could
be the completion of a procedure, the availability of a
computed result, or an error condition. [Reed79]
The eventcount can only be modified by placing a call to
the advance (EVC) procedure, where EVC is the eventcount in
use. This has the result of increasing the value of EVC by
one. By doing this it is possible to signal the system of
the occurrence of an event.
The value of an eventcount can be read by the read (EVC)
function. This function returns the current value of the
eventcount, with the value being the number of advance (EVC)
calls that have been placed before the call. Since mutual
exclusion is not guaranteed, it is possible that the value
of the EVC can be changed during the read operation. This
equates to the read function returning the minimum value of
the eventcount at any given moment.
Constant reading of an eventcount provides a way to
monitor the occurrence of an event. The busy wait loop can
be avoided by the use of the await (EVC, x) primitive. The
use of this primitive causes the calling process to suspend
until the value of EVC is equal to or greater than that of
x. If the value of x is less than or equal to the value of




One of the drawbacks of the use of pure eventcounts is
the lack of mediation between concurrent processes that must
be synchronized. An example of this is two processes that
are trying to update a file at the same time. There has to
be some mechanism to guarantee that one request is processed
before the other to ensure consistency of the data. Reed
and Kanodia [Reed79] describe an additional object called a
sequencer, which provides the ability to differentiate
between two processes that act independently. It does this
by using a ticket (SEQ) primitive, where SEQ is the
sequencer.
The ticket (SEQ) function, much like the read(EVC)
operation, returns the current value of the sequencer.
However, the ticket function has the side effect of
incrementing the value of the sequencer by one. This,
combined with the use of mutual exclusion for the ticket
section of the operating system, which guarantees that only
one ticket request will be processed at a time, ensures
that for each call, the ticket function will return a unique
value. From the value that was returned from the ticket
operation it is possible to determine which process
requested a ticket first.
To aid in understanding the use of a sequencer in
conjunction with an associated eventcount, the bakery ticket
machine is often used as an example. In this example the
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customer walks up to the machine and takes a ticket. Since
only one customer can take a ticket at a time, each ticket
value is unique. This is the ticket operation with the
ticket machine acting as the sequencer. The customer then
sits down and waits until the turn indicator on the wall,
the eventcount, reaches his ticket value, the await
operation. After the baker finishes with a customer he
increments the turn indicator, the advance primitive, and
calls for the next customer.
C. RELATION TO SEMAPHORES
An interesting side light is the claim in [Reed79] that
semaphores can be built out of eventcounts and sequencers.
This is from the view that eventcounts and sequencers are
lower level then semaphores. The paper shows how to
construct P and V, and even a simultaneous P operation out
of eventcounts and sequencers. [Reed79]
The Concurrent Computer Corporation chose eventcounts
and sequencers to implement some of the primitives required
for a new operating system. In [Rosk86] it shows that it is
not always possible to construct semaphores out of
eventcount and sequencer, because of the lack of a
conditional ticket operation. If a ticket is taken it must
be used, or a dummy process must take the place of the
original process and advance the eventcount.
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D. SECURITY OF EVENTCOUNTS AND SEQUENCERS
Of special interest is the suitability of the primitives
to the secure computing environment. The advance operation
can be classified as a pure write. In a pure write no
information about the value of the eventcount, either
current or previous, is transmitted back to the calling
process. This property makes it possible to advance an
eventcount that has a security classification at the same or
higher level of the calling process, the modify domain.
The read and await primitives can be thought of as pure
reads, because no information is modified when the values
are returned. There is no primitive to determine if other
processes are waiting for the eventcount, making it
impossible for one process to determine the status of other
processes. Thus, the read and await primitives can be used
on eventcounts of equal or lower security classification
than the calling process, the observe domain.
The ticket operation on the sequencer is both a
read/write operation. Since the ticket operation returns
and changes the value of the sequencer, the ticket operation
can only be used in the intersection of the modify and
observe domains. Thus the sequencer must be at the same
security level as the calling process.
Using eventcounts, it is possible to introduce a "secure
readers-writers problem." The underlying idea is that the
readers do not have the ability to modify any of the data in
42
the data base or to signal any of the writers or other
readers. [Reed79] provides implementation to solve this
problem in its purest sense. Of interest to this thesis is
a modification to this problem, the "multilevel secure
readers-writers problem." The problem is constructed by
adding multilevel security to the "secure readers-writers
problem.
"
F. IMPLEMENTATION OF EVENTCOUNTS AND SEQUENCERS IN GEMSOS
To provide the required process synchronization Gemini
Computers chose eventcounts and sequencers. The shared main
memory of the Gemini Computer provided the required
architecture for the execution of the synchronization
mechanism. The built-in security aspects of operations made
them the ideal choice for a secure system. The pure read
and writes of the primitive operations are considerably
simpler to verify than some of the traditional
synchronization mechanisms.
One of the goals in designing a security kernel was to
keep the kernel as small as possible. In order to do this,
GEMSOS views each eventcount and sequencer as an integral
part of a segment. The naming and the security
classification of the eventcount and sequencer is the same
as that of the owning segment. By having common names, the
kernel has fewer entities to keep track of for security
purposes. While there is wasted space created by unused
eventcounts and sequencers, it is more than compensated for
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by the reduced kernel size and complexity in the naming of
the objects. [Gemi84]
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IV. RESEARCH MODEL AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. INTRODUCTION
A software system was created to explore the multilevel
secure process and to demonstrate success of the proposed
concept
.
The system was developed in the framework of an
electronic mail system where each user represents a process.
This allows for the creation of multilevel secure data which
is sent to and used by a multilevel secure process. The
system was first be developed to run with two users of the
same level and then was extended to different levels and to
more users. The implementation was done primarily in Pascal
MT+ and on the Gemini Trusted Microcomputer.
B. DESIGN LIMITATIONS
The overriding limitation in the design of this system
was the availability of the Gemini TCB. The availability of
the hardware forces the design decision later in the
development process. As a result of the availability of
support documentation and software available from Gemini




C. DESCRIPTION OF NEED
An electronic mail network was chosen to model the
parallel multilevel secure processes. The electronic mail
system was chosen for its inherent parallelism. It is
assumed that multiple users might be active at any given
moment. The mail system was made multilevel secure to fully
exercise the capabilities of the TCB. The implementation of
this system is done to prove that, given that combination of
hardware and software support and an integrated security
design, a multilevel secure process can operate without
severe performance degradation.
1 . Environment of Employment
For the purpose of illustration a fictitious United
States Marine Corps Infantry Battalion headquarters will be
used. Figure 9 shows an organizational diagram. For
simplicity, assume that the battalion is in garrison and





















Figure 9. Marine Infantry Battalion's Headquarters
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The Commanding Officer (CO) would task the Executive
Officer (XO) with gathering all the required information on
data usage and security requirements to present to the
Divisional Information Systems Management Officer (ISMO)
.
The ISMO will then develop the technical specification of
the system. The XO and ISMO will then oversee the
contracting and installation of the system.
In the battalion the individual sections each have a
security requirement based upon the type of data that they
deal with in execution of their duties. The Personnel
section (S-l) deals with CONFIDENTIAL data which deals with
the status of forces and privacy act information. The
Intelligence section (S-2) has all the information on battle
plans, both friend and foe, which are classified at the TOP
SECRET level. The Operations section (S-3) has the TOP
SECRET mobilization and deployment plans as well as the
schemes of maneuver and weapons data. All of the SECRET
data which deals with the status of the supplies and
logistics is kept by the Logistics section (S-4) . The
Chaplain is not authorized access to any of the battalion's
classified data, but does need to access unclassified data on
the system. Both the CO and XO have to be able to access
all data within the battalion, and as such are classified as
TOP SECRET users. All of the battalion's sections are
cleared only up to and including the level of the data being




Based upon the data and security requirements of the
battalion, two different approaches are possible for the
implementation of an electronic mail network. The first is
the use of four separate electronic mail networks. Each one
of the networks would operate at a single level of security,
yielding a single level system. Figures 10(a) through (d)
show how the sections would be connected to the different
networks. In this solution four separate network servers
are required. This approach requires that the TOP SECRET
users have four terminals, one for each network available to
them. SECRET users will have three, CONFIDENTIAL would have
two, and the Chaplain will have only one terminal on his
desk. This system would require a total of 22 terminals,
four servers, and multiple cable runs. To check all of the
incoming messages the CO would have to login to the four
different networks. Clearly, there has to be a more
efficient way of implementing the network.
3 Multilevel Secure Solution
A much more efficient use of resources would be to
combine the four different levels of security on one
machine. This approach is not unique [NRLR82; Wyat84]. The
implementation of this system requires the use of a Trusted
Computer Base (TCB) to act as the central message server and
one terminal at each of the nodes, seven total. The



































































Figure 10. Single Level Networks
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result in a system that will be easier for the user to
employ. The coding of the system will be more complex and
the individual pieces of hardware will be more expensive.
D. REQUIREMENTS
The requirements of the model have been broken down into
two general categories; user interface and computational.
The separation of the two requirement areas allows the
division of the Secure Mail System (SMS) into two main
logical divisions. The user interface corresponds to the
unsecure section, and the computational requirement is
fulfilled in the security relevant sections.
1. User Interface Requirements
The user interface of the SMS was designed to
provide a simple interactive single screen text processor
that the user could master in relatively few sessions.
Thus, WordStar-like editing commands were chosen for the
basic editing functions. The selection of an option is done
from menus or boolean (yes/no response) questions.
After the user has logged onto the system he will be
presented with a menu of options and a listing of the
current messages. The actions from the main menu will be
able to create, edit, delete, read, or send a message. From
this menu the user will be able to terminate his current
mail session.
The user will be able to select from a menu of up to
nine pending messages to edit, delete or send. A similar
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list of up to nine incoming messages will be available to
read or delete.
The following is a summary listing of the minimal
requirements for the SMS message editor:
1. Single screen (22 lines by 80 characters)
.
2. Heading to indicate destination, classification, and
Date and time created on top line of the screen.
3. Full Cursor control movement within the text area.
4. A means to toggle text insert on and off.
5. Line wrap. (When you reach the end of the line the
cursor goes to the first position of the next line.)
6. The return key works as expected; position the cursor
on the first character of the next line.
7. Must provide a unique key to end the editing of the
message.
8. Save/No save option after all creation and editing.
9. Ability to delete the current character, the one the
cursor is under.
10. The ability to edit a previously created, but unsent,
message.
11. Recall a previously created message for modification,
transmission and/or retransmission.
2 . Computational Requirements
The computational requirements have been separated
from the user requirements to decrease the amount of
security relevant code. The security system has been
divided into three major subareas; system configuration,
user authentication and data access.
System configuration is done by the System Security
Manager (SSM) at boot time. This process involves selecting
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the terminal ports and the security levels for the selected
ports. The selected security level is the maximum security
level of data for the terminal, the minimum is set to
UNCLASSIFIED by default. The system supports four
classification levels, UNCLASSIFIED through TOP SECRET,
without any compartments. Once the SSM makes these
selections they remain static until the system is rebooted
and reconfigured.
User authentication is accomplished by GEMSOS when
the system is booted by the SSM and within the SMS when a
user tries to log on to the terminal. The login process
verifies the user by a login and password combination. It
next prompts the user for a desired security level for the
session. The user's request is then checked against the
user's and terminal's upper security bounds. If the
requested classification is out of bounds, the
login/password are incorrect, or the user is not authorized
access to the system and access is denied without divulging
the reason.
Once the user has been admitted to the system GEMSOS
handles most of the data access authentication. The
exception is when a user desires to send a message to
another user. At this point the SMS must verify the
receiver has access to data at that security level before
passing the write request to GEMSOS for execution.
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E. OVERVIEW OF THE SECURE MAIL SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section an overview of the SMS will be presented
at the module level. A more detailed description of the
procedures can be found in Appendixes B through D which
contain the SMS Code. The segment storage structure that is
generated by the system generation process (sysgening the
system) can be found in Figure 11. The loader and operator
login processes used in the system are the standard
processes provided by Gemini Computers. Since these two
modules are covered in [Gemi86c] , they will not be covered
in this thesis. The logical relationship between the two
SMS processes is shown in Figure 12.
1. Data Structures
To gain a firm grasp on the structure of the SMS,
knowledge of the system's data structures is required. It
is how these structures are stored and accessed by the
machine that affects the security credibility of the system.
As with all data that is stored by GEMSOS, each of the data
structures, has a security level label associated with the
segment that contains the data. As stated earlier, each of
the segments contains an eventcount and sequencer that is
maintained by GEMSOS. Through the use of these two
mechanisms it is possible to control access to the segments.
The first data structure that is of concern is the
user array. This is one of two data structures that is












































Figure 12. SMS Process Relationships
individual node processes (the other being the process
definition structure that is required by GEMSOS to
initialize a child process) . The purpose of this is to
provide all of the node processes a listing of all users of
the system with the maximum access class, password and user
number. This is used by the message sending module to
verify that a user can receive mail at the desired security
classification level. The user login module reads this
array to ensure that a person trying to log into the system
is an authorized user. This array is created prior to
sysgening the system and remains static during the operation
of the system. This allows the SMS to service users that do
not have access to GEMSOS directly. The structure
definition is contained in Figure 13.
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User rec is a record of:

















User_array is an array index to Max_user of User_rec
Figure 13. Definition of the User Array
The structure of the message headers is given in
Figure 14. Each user has two message header arrays, one for
pending and the other for received message headers, for all
of his messages, regardless of the classification level.









Character Human readable security
classification




String[4] Last edit time
String[6] Last edit date
Figure 14 . Structure of the Message Header
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This requires the read and write processes to be multilevel
trusted processes. The design decision to use a multilevel
header array was made early in the design process to ensure
ease of use by the user. By having multilevel headers it is
possible that a user could view a single screen containing
the headers and find what message he had awaiting action
regardless of the security class under which he is
operating. The message headers are grouped into a record
containing two arrays of nine elements, one array for
incoming and one for outgoing messages, as shown in Figure
15. Each user's message header array is stored in a
separate segment which is indexed by his user number.
Theaderarray is an array 1..9 of messheading
Userhead is a record of:
Field Name Data Type Purpose
Income Theaderarray Array of incoming messages
Outgo Theaderarray Array of outgoing messages
Figure 15. Structure of the Message Header
Storage Structure
The final major data structure is the message itself
as shown in Figure 16. The heading of the message is the
same as that of the corresponding entry in the message
heading array. The size of the body of the message was
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Messtext is a record of:
Field Name Data Type Purpose
Heading Messheading Message header for the message
Body Array of Message text
2. .23, 1. .80
of Character
Figure 16. Structure of a Message
determined by the requirement for a single screen editor.
The array's index range corresponds to the line numbers on
the screen display. This was done to facilitate the mapping
of characters from the array to the screen. The messages
are stored, by user, as segments with 18 messages of the
same security classification per segment. The first nine
messages are incoming messages and the remainder are the
outgoing messages. This storage method creates at least 54
unused message spaces per user spread out over four
segments. This method allows the different security
classification to be stored as separate segments, allowing
for single level segments with GEMSOS providing the security
enforcement. Each of the messages can be uniquely
identified by the security classification (which major
branch) , user number (which segment) , and message number
(location within the segment) . The separation of security
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levels and the ease of access offsets the wasted space in




The system configuration module is the first process
executed once the control of the machine has been passed to
the application programs from the login process. The SSM
can configure the Gemini TCB's terminal ports, within the
security constraints stored in the system security memory.
The maximum number of terminals that can be configured is
determined at compile time of the System Configuration
Module by a named constant embedded in the code. The
maximum number of users must be known at sysgen time to
construct the sufficient number of code and message
segments. Once all of the desired terminals have been
configured, the system configuration process then spawns all
of the SMS node processes.
3. SMS User Control Menu Module
The SMS user control module acts as a master process
for the individual users. It attaches the terminal to the
process and then passes control to the user login module.
When a user successfully gains access to the system he is
then presented with a menu of options for him to select as
shown in Figure 17. When the user selects a valid option,
control is then passed to the appropriate module. Upon
completion of an action, control is passed back to the SMS




C. Create a message
E. Edit a message
R. Read message
S. Send a message
D. Delete a message
Q. Duit message editor
You have the following Messages:
Class From Time Date
1. U Stewart 0721 680607
The Following messages are pending:
Class To Time Date
1. U west 0715 880607










Figure 17. SMS Main Menu
user exits the system, control is passed to the user login
process.
4 . User Login Module
This module is called by the user control module to
verify the access authorization of the user. This process
reads the user array segment to verify the login, password,
and access level. Since this module reads a classified
segment, it falls within the security perimeter and must be
proved correct. After each login attempt the process
detaches and then reattaches the terminal before passing
control back to the calling procedure.
60
5. Create Message Module
This module creates a blank message form in memory
after obtaining a message identification number from the
header array if one is available. The system provides the
security classification for the message (the current level
at which the user is logged in) , date and time of creation,
and originator. The user provides the recipient's
identifier. At this time the message is then passed to part
of the edit module for the input of the text. After the
user has completed editing the message he is given the
option of saving the message or deleting it.
6. Read Message Module
This module allows the user to read a pending
message, either incoming or outgoing without doing any
modifications. One of the functions of this module is
displaying a message on the screen as shown in Figure 18.
The message display routine is used by the create and edit





This module allows the user to select any of the out
going messages for editing. A subset of WordStar commands
are used for the editing features. Appendix D contains the
specific commands and their functions. None of the message
header information can be changed by the user in this
module. If the message was of lower security classification
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Select one of the following Messages:
Class From To Time Date
1. U pratt west 0715 880607
£. U pratt Stewart 0716 880607
3. U pratt lengenf
e
0717 880607







Figure 18. Message Selection Menu
than the current session, the security classification is
changed to reflect the reclassification as a result of the
modification. This prevents a user from circumventing the
security classification system for the messages.
8 . Send Message Module
The send module provides the user a means of
transmitting a message to another user. The send message
process is set up to allow the user to send a message that
is classified at the current operating security level. The
message header is displayed and the user is able to change
the recipient of the message at this time. When the message
is sent the system then updates the message header with the
current data and time. A table look up is done on the user
array to ensure that the recipient's name matches a user of
the system. If no match is found the user is given the
option of specifying a new name or aborting the message
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sending process. The system verifies that the recipient has
access to the security classification of the message and an
empty slot in the receive message header array. If the
message is unable to be delivered that user is notified as
such, without being given a reason. The message is not
deleted from the message sender's message space by this
module. This feature makes it possible to send a single
message to multiple user without rekeying the message.
9 . Delete Message Module
This module deletes the selected entry in the
message header array and the message text. Both the message
header array and the message text segments can be considered
pooled resources. As such the data storage area must be
overwritten by the delete process before the message can be
considered deleted and the space reused. Since the delete
option is a write operation, the user can only delete
messages at the same security level where currently
operating.
10. Message Header Array Access Module
This module is comprised of two major low level
routines, the read and write header routines. These are
trusted processes since the system maintains one header file
for all of a user's messages regardless of the security
level at which individual message were created. When a user
enters the system at a classification lower then some of his
pending messages, the header array will show the presence of
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the messages by displaying the security classification of
the message, but not the time, date, destination, or origin
information that is contained in the header. This is done
to allow the user to be alerted to the fact that he has the
message but keeping the amount of information disclosed
about the message to a minimum. This display of the
security classification can be considered a covert storage
channel in the system since the user can find out
information concerning data of a higher security
classification. Covert channels in the system will be
discussed in a later section. This module is within the
security perimeter, and has such the code has to be
validated. The section on concurrency controls details how
the read and write operations are accomplished.
11. Message Text Access Module
As in the message header access module, there are
two major routines that comprise this module; read and write
message operations. By placing a call to the read operation
the user is able to read any of his messages that are at his
current security level or a lower level. The write
operation is strictly a single level operation. This is due
to the use of the ticket primitive to ensure consistency of
the data, as outlined in the chapter on eventcounts and
sequencers. Both of the routines use the security features
implemented in GEMSOS to ensure there are no unauthorized
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data accesses. This module is within the security
perimeter.
12 . Terminal Control Module
This module is made up of two routines that are
dependent on the type of terminal connected to the system.
For this implementation, the DEC VT100 control set was
chosen due to equipment availability. One of the routines
provides the ability to clear the screen using the terminal
control sequences. A direct cursor addressing procedure has
been implemented. The direct cursor addressing is required
by the message editor's cursor movement functions and the
menus throughout the system. All of the procedures in this
module write directly to the write device, rather then
returning strings to the calling process.
F. CONCURRENCY CONTROL
Collectively the data segments can be thought of as a
hierarchical database. The different security classes of
message texts and the message headers form separate major
branches. The message header branch then branches off in
individual leaves for each user's message header. Each user
has a leaf on each of the security branches if he has access
to that security level. The leaves in turn are made up of
the user's message texts for that security level. With this
data base structure, the SMS is a database management
process where multiple users are accessing the same data
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base and their actions must be coordinated to ensure data
consistency and verified to ensure the access is authorized.
The SMS will have a separate process running for each
user node. Each process will be making updates to a
multilevel security message database. This is the
"multilevel secure readers-writers problem" that was
presented in the previous chapter. To solve this problem,
two modes of concurrency control are required; data access
and process scheduling.
1. Data Access Control
In the "multilevel secure readers-writers problem"
we have the constraints that a process can read lower level
data, write higher level data, and modify data at the same
level. GEMSOS provides the required security checks on the
eventcounts and sequencers as an integral part of the data
segments. This eliminates the need for any explicit
checking of access authorization for the security classes in
the code.
The use of eventcounts and sequencers is limited to
the synchronizing of access to data. Read operations, which
can be done by more than one process concurrently with no
loss of consistency in the system, use only eventcounts to
ensure that the data is in a consistent state. By using
only eventcounts it is possible to read any data from the
same or lower security classes. The eventcount is read at
two points in the system read process, once before the data
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is read and once after. If the two values of the eventcount
are the same, there were no writes during the read process.
If the values are different the read aborts and restarts.
This ensures that the data is read in a consistent state.
Figure 19 contains the pseudocode for the algorithm.
Make security branch mentor known
Make message segment known
Swapin message segment
Make pointer to the segment
REPEAT
Read Segment's Eventcount
Move selected data to desired data structure
Read segment's eventcount
UNTIL the two eventcount values are equal
Terminate message segment
Terminate security branch mentor
Figure 19. Sample Read Operation
The writing process must provide a means for the
writer to gain exclusive control (only one write operation
at a time) of the data to ensure consistency of the data.
To do this, the ticket operation is used; it is the only
mechanism that provides mutual exclusion. The single level
security limitation of the ticket operation prohibits
writing data at any security level except the current
security level. After every write operation, the
appropriate eventcount is advanced to ensure the data is in
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a consistent state. A pseudocode implementation of the
write process can be found in Figure 20.
Make security branch mentor known
Make message segment known
Swapin message segment
Obtain a TICKET from the segment
AWAIT the value of the ticket
Make pointer to the segment
Move data from the data structure into the segment
ADVANCE the segment's eventcount
Terminate message segment
Terminate security branch mentor
Figure 20. Sample Write Operation
2 . Process Scheduling
As outlined in Chapter II, GEMSOS is capable of
multiprogramming and multiprocessing. Due to the structure
of the SMS, with one master process creating the node
processes, all processes are run on a single processor, the
multiprocessing feature is not used by the SMS. This makes
use of the multiprogramming scheduling algorithm in GEMSOS.
The "run to block" algorithm is used by the system. Each of
the processes will run until a request is placed for a
service that can not be immediately provided, at which time
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it will block and a ready process will be allowed to
commence execution.
G. COVERT CHANNELS
As with most secure systems, covert channels exist in
the SMS. In this section the channels found during a search
of the system and code will be discussed, rationalized and
an estimated bandwidth given. A channel naming system that
was presented in [Gass88] is used to identify the type of
channel. The author has not had formal training in the
evaluation of secure systems and as such more, covert
channels may exist and the computed bandwidth may be
incorrect. The bandwidths computed in this section tend to
be overly pessimistic in that it would be impossible for a
user to sustain the channels at the computed bandwidths.
1. Storage Channels
The message header array is an object attribute
channel. When the array is displayed on the terminal it is
possible to find out the security class of all the user's
messages. Given that there are a maximum of nine messages
and four possible security classes for each message the most
information that can be leaked is 3 6 bits. Assuming that no
more then one screen display per second is possible, the
maximum band width is 32 bits per second. The actual
bandwidth will be considerably smaller since much of the
header array will remain static for a length of time. This
covert channel, while it has a large potential bandwidth, is
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not deemed serious. The justification for this is that a
user is authorized access to the data that is being leaked
to him by the channel.
The message header also presents the opportunity to
use an object existence channel. By sending a user repeated
messages it is possible to compute the number of messages
that were pending prior to the attack. From the total of
nine messages, four bits are required to identify explicitly
the number of messages. In the worst case one attempt is
required to determine that the recipient has nine messages.
This action will take about one second for a bandwidth of
four bits per second. This channel is created by the static
nature of the header array. A variable length header array,
such as a linked list, would not have this channel.
It is possible for a user to create an object
existence channel to determine the maximum security class of
each user on the system. This can be done by attempting to
send highly classified mail to a known user downgrading each
successive message until a message is received. With the
four security classes, four bits of data are leaked out in
each attempt. These four bits times the number of users
equals the maximum amount of information that can be gained
by this channel. Assuming all users are at the highest
classification level tried, at best case it would take four
to five seconds per attempt. The resulting bandwidth would
be about one bit per second. The justification for allowing
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the existence of this channel is that most users know each
others security clearances in advance since such information
is readily available.
2 . Timing Channels
Knowing that the Gemini Computer uses a run to block
scheduling algorithm, it is possible for a knowledgeable
user to make a rough determination of the system load by the
delay in the services provided by the system. Write access
to the data segments is controlled by the ticket mechanism,
which allows one user at a time to access the data. This
delay would make it possible for a user to determine if
other users were trying to access the same data segment.
These two timing channels can be defeated by installing a
random length delay loop in the sections of code that reads
and writes the data to the segments. The channels'
existence can be rationalized by the fact that the
perpetrator cannot compute the correct number of users on
the system
—
just a rough idea of that number.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
It was the purpose of this thesis to demonstrate that it
is possible to design a parallel multilevel secure process
that is simple for a user to operate. The result was a menu
driven electronic mail system that allows up to 12 users and
four levels of security classification. This system
demonstrates that the goal of the thesis is attainable.
Programming in a secure and parallel environment
requires a different "mind set" than conventional unsecure
single process programming. For a secure environment the
programmers must know the classification of the data and
which sections of code can access particular data. In a
parallel environment the system's designers must impose
controls on data access to ensure all reads and writes are
atomic (no other process can alter the data during the
transaction) and no data is left in an inconsistent state.
Security can be built into a system with minimum
overhead and additional expense. This is true if the system
designers consider security as an integral part of the
system.
Eventcounts and sequencers are an efficient and simple
way to control access to shared data by parallel processes.
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The fact that reading and writing of eventcounts can be
separated make them ideal for use in a secure environment.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The author severely underestimated the skill level and
expertise needed to program in a secure environment. For
this reason, if the Gemini computers owned by the Naval
Postgraduate School are to be used, an ongoing research
program must be developed. This will allow experience to be
passed from one thesis student to the next in a series of
follow on theses.
The Gemini TCB is capable of supporting up to 48
terminals, whereas, SMS currently limits the number of
terminals and users to 12 . The data structures of the
system can be modified to allow the SMS to support more than
12 users.
The message storage formats used by the SMS waste
considerable amount of space. A more efficient means of
storage would be to create a new segment for every message
under a mentor segment unique to each security class and
user pair.
The use of secure computers warrants considerable study.
A secure computer is a special purpose computer, and as such
should be used for specific applications. Programming a
secure computer is considerably more difficult than a normal
computer. The increased difficulty is offset by the
benefits of a secure system for certain applications. If
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the system has an overriding security requirement then a
secure computer should be considered.
The Naval Postgraduate School has the resources
available to develop a comprehensive program to explore the
uses of secure computers. Such a program should include the
development of applications for, and the management of,
secure computers. This program should be under a larger and
more general Automated Data Processing (ADP) security
program.
C. FINAL COMMENT
Computers can be made only as secure as the least
trusted individual who has access to them. To paraphrase a




USER MANUAL FOR THE SECURE MAIL SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
The Secure Mail System (SMS) is a multilevel secure
electronic mail system. It can support up to 12 users on 12
active terminals. Four separate security classifications of
messages are used by the system to segregate the messages.
The system has been divided into two logical areas.
System initialization is done by the System Security Manager
(SSM) at boot time. This process then spawns the node
process in which all user interaction takes place.
B. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
During the system initialization process the SSM
configures the system by specifying the active terminals and
the security classification for the selected terminals. A
menu is presented to select the terminal from a list of
terminals that are connected to the system. Once the SSM
selects a terminal he is then prompted for a security class.
After the node parameters have been selected, the
configuration process spawns the node process. This is
repeated until all terminals have been configured. At this
time the configuration process blocks.
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C. NODE PROCESS
The node process runs on each terminal and provides the
user interaction. The user is required to verify his
identity by of a username/password login sequence. At this
point the session security class is selected. If the user
does not provide a correct login sequence within three
tries, the terminal process blocks. The SSM must then
restart the system.
Upon successful login into the system the user is
presented with a menu of options and a listing of incoming
and outgoing messages. The options include edit, create,
read, delete, send and quit. The after selecting the edit
option the user is then prompted to make a selection from a
list of messages. Once the menu has been selected the user
is presented with the text that had been previously entered
into the message. From here any of the commands listed in
Table A-l can be used. When the user exits the editing mode
the date, time and the security classification are updated
to reflect the current system parameters.
By selecting the create option the user indicates that
he desires to create a new message form. This can only be
done when there is an empty space in the message header
array. The user is prompted for the destination of the
message, the rest of the header is filled in by the system.
The system then goes into the edit mode to allow the user to





A e Cursor up
Ax Cursor down
A s Cursor left
Bksp Cursor left
Ad Cursor right
Am Go to first position of the next
line
Return Go to first position of the next
line
A a Go to start of current line
A f Go to end of current line
A r Go to top of message text
A c Go to bottom of message text
A i Tab, move cursor 5 spaces right
Av Turn insert mode on, any control
character turn insert mode off
Ag Delete a character
Ay Delete a line
A
z Exit edit mode
editing the user is asked if they would like to save the
message and for the destination of the message.
The read option allows the user to view a message with-
out the ability to edit it. This is useful when he desires
to consult a lower level security message.
Upon selecting the delete option the user is queried to
find out if he desires to delete an incoming or outgoing
message. Once that selection has been made a list of the
messages is displayed. From this menu the user selects the
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message number for deletion. Both the header and the
message text are overwritten in this process.
When the user desires to send a message he is presented
with a list of messages available for transmission. When he
selects one of the messages the security class is checked
and upgraded if it is lower than the current session
security level. The user is prompted for the destination of
the message. The data and time are updated before the
message is sent. This process does not delete the message,
thereby allowing the same message to be sent to multiple
users without rekeying.
The quit option logs the user out and allows a new user
to login to the system at a new security class.
D. SUMMARY
The SMS was designed to be a simple user friendly secure
electronic mail system. Commercially available unsecure
electronic mail systems offer many more features but do not




SMS CONFIGURATION MODULE CODE
The source code for this module contains routines that
are proprietary to Gemini Computers. In order to allow
unlimited distribution, the code has not been included in
this thesis. Code for this module is available from the WAR
lab custodian at the following address:
Superintendent, Code 55wg
Naval Postgraduate School




1 {This code was written in Pascal MIH- version 3.0. It is
2 linked using the following command line for the KLnkmt
3 program:
4
5 Linkmt sms = f:rl-irdt,sms,f:lf30/s,rllib/s,paslib/s/p:80
6
7 The code is shared among all node processes, each node has a
8 separate stack and data segment.
}
9 {$e-}
10 {$K0} {$KL} {$K2} {$K3} {$K5} {$K6} {$K7}





16 {$i f: gate-con. zli)
17 {$i f:rl-con.zli}
18 {$i f:user-con. zli}
19 (* {$i f:cd-con.zli} *)
20 {program specific constants}
21 userseg = 11;
22 headerseg = 2;
23 useg = 3;
24 cseg = 4;
25 sseg = 5;







33 {program specific types}
34 {$i sms.typ}
35















This is the node process




53 success, result : integer;
54 user : string;
55 minclass,maxclass,userclass :access_class;
56 choice : char;
57 innotout : boolean;
58 trycntr : integer;
59 portno : integer;
60








66 headerarray : theaderarray;




71 Selectfile (user, userclass, FALSE, choice)
;
72 if choice <> '0' then
73 begin
74 messnum := ord (choice) - 48;






78 disp2 (message) ;
79 repeat




82 putln(w_dev, ' ');
83 until yesno in [ ,y» , 'n' , 'Y' , 'N' ] ;
84 if yesno in ['y','Y'] then
85 begin
86 repeat
87 putstr(w_dev, 'Is the destination of the message')
;
88 putstr(w_dev, • correct? (Y/N) ');
89 getchar(r_dev, yesno)
;
90 putln(w_dev, ' ');
91 until yesno in [ 'y' , 'n' , 'Y' , 'N']
92 if yesno in ['N','n'] then
93 begin





97 getusernum (message. heading. reci, sendnum, result)
;
98 if result = then
99 begin
100 findheaderslot (message. heading. reci,userclass,
101 TRUE, destno) ;
102 if destno <> then
103 begin
104 {send the message}
105 writeheader (message, heading, reci, TRUE, userclass,
106 message.heading, destno, result)
;
107 writefile (TRUE, userclass, destno,message,heading,
108 message , result)
;
109 {update user's version}
110 writeheader (user, FALSE,userclass,message,heading,
111 messnum, result)
112 writefile (FALSE , userclass ,messnum ,message .heading
,
113 message, result)




118 putln(w_dev, 'Unable to deliver the message')
119 putstr(w_dev, ' Check destination '' s username ')
;





125 putln(w_dev, 'Unable to deliver the message') ;
126 putstr(w_dev, 'Check destination' 's username');









135 PROCEDURE hcokup_console(portno: integer;wrt_dev : integer;
136 rd_dev : integer)
;
137 var




142 attach (portno, wrt_dev, false, success );
143 until (success = no_error)
;
144 repeat
145 attach (portno, rd_dev, true, success )
;





150 PROCEDURE userlogin (V7AR user:string8; Var userclass : access_class
;
151 maxclass : access_class ;portno : integer ;Var result : integer)
;
152 var
153 password : string8;
154 userin : char;
155 usernum : integer;
156 begin
157 result := 0;
158 userin := 'U'
;




162 putstr(w_dev, 'Login: ');
163 getln(r_dev ; user)
;
164 putstr(w_dev, 'Password (will not echo): •);
165 noecho_getln(r_dev, password)
;
166 putln(w_dev, ' ');
167 repeat
168 putstr(w_dev, 'Desired access class (U/C/S/T) : ');
169 getchar(r_dev, userin)
;
170 putln(w_dev, ' ');
171 until userin in [ 'U' , 'C , 'S' , "I" , 'u» , 'c' , 's' , 't' ]
;
172 if ord (userin) > 96 then
173 userin := chr (ord (userin) -32)







175 'U' : userclass. coitpromise[0]
176 'C : userclass. conpramise[0]
177 'S' : userclass. compromise [0]
178 "I" : userclass. corpromise[0]
179 end;
180 { detach (w_dev)
;
181 detach (r_dev) ; )
182 (* do look up for username, password, access class *)
183 lcoloipuser (user, password / userclass, usernum, result) ;
184 if (userclass. ccmpromise[0] > maxclass. cortprcmise[0])
185 and (result = 0) then result := 4;





191 PROCEDURE lookupuser (user, password :string8;userclass : access_class
192 var usernum: integer ;var result: integer)
;
193 var
194 arrayptr : userptr;
195 seg_number,size,cntr : integer;




198 (*putln(w_dev, 'in the look up user proc 1 ) ;*)
199 mclass := init. resources.max_class;
200 segjTvakeknown(init.initial_seg[2] ,Userseg,seg_number,




203 arrayptr := libjnnk^ntr(ldt_table,seg_number,l)
;
204 cntr := 0;
205 while (cntr < max_user) and
206 not (arrayptr^ [cntr] .name = user) do
207 begin
208 cntr := cntr + 1;
209 end;
210 if arrayptrA [cntr] .name = user then
211 begin
212 usernum := cntr;
213 if password = arrayptrA [usernum] .pswd then
214 begin
215 if (userclass.ccjnpromise[0] <=
216 arrayptrA [usernum] .max_class . compromise [ ] ) then
217 result := 0;
218 end
219 else
220 result := 2;
221 end
222 else






228 PROCEDURE getusernum(user:string8;Var usernum, result: integer) ;
229 var
230 arrayptr : userptr;
231 seg_number, cntr, size : integer;
232 mclass : access_class;
233 begin
234 mclass := init. resources.max_class;
235 seg_makeknown ( init . initial_seg [ 2 ] ,Userseg , seg_number
,
236 r_w, size,mclass, result)
237 show_err( 'get usernum makeknown result = ' , result)
;
238 swapin_segment(seg_number, result)
239 show_err( 'get usernum swapin result = ', result)
240
241 arrayptr := lib_mk_pntr(ldt_table,seg_number,l)
242 cntr := 0;
243 while (cntr < maxjjser) and (arrayptrA [cntr] .name <> user) do
244 begin
245 cntr := cntr + 1;
246 end;
247 if (userclass. compromise [0] <=
248 arrayptrA [cntr] .max_class. compromise [0])
84
249 and (arrayptrA [cntr] .name = user) then
250 begin
251 result := 0;
252 usernum := cntr;
253 end
254 else
255 result := 1;
256 seg_termirate(segjiumber,cntr)
;





261 PROCEDURE writefile(innotout: boolean;sec_class:aa3ess_class;
262 messnum:integer;mhead:messheading;




266 usernum : integer;
267 size, segl,seg2,evcl,evc2, cntr : integer;
268 arrayptr : messptr;
269 user :string8;
270 branch : integer;
271 tempptr : varjpointer;
272 messptr : Amesstext;
273 begin
274 {ensure no write down is allowed}
275 if sec_class.compromise[0] >= mhead. class. compromise [0] then
276 begin
277 if innotout then
278 user := mhead. reci
279 else
280 user := mhead. from;
281 case mhead. class. compromise [0] of
282 unclass_level : branch := useg;
283 confJLevel : branch := cseg;
284 secret_level : branch := sseg;
285 t_secret_level : branch := tsseg;






291 segjmakekna^(:uiit.initial_seg[2] , branch, segl,
292 r_w, size, sec_class, result)
;
293 show_err('write file make known result 1 = ', result)
;
294
295 seg_makeknown (segl,usernum, seg2,
296 r_w, size, sec_class, result)
297 show_err( 'write file make known result 2 = ', result)
298
299 swapin_segment (seg2 , result)
;
300 show err ('write file swapin result = ', result);
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302 ticket (seg2,evcl / result)
;
303 show_err( 'write file ticket result = ' , result);
304 await (seg2,evcl, result)
;
305 shcw_err('write file await result = ', result);
306
307 tempptr . seg := lib_mk_sel (ldt_table, seg2 , 1)
;
308 if innotout then
309 tempptr. off := (messnum - 1) * sizeof (messtext)
310 else
311 tempptr. off := (messnum + 8) * sizeof (messtext)
;
312 messptr := tempptr. p;
313 messptrA := message;
314
315 advance (seg2 / result)
;
316 show_err('write file advance result = ^result);
317
318 segjterminate (seg2 , result)
;
319
320 seg_terminate (segl, result)
321 end
322 else




327 PROCEDURE readfile (innotout :boolean;sec_class: access_class
;
328 messnum: integer;mhead:messheading;




332 usernum : integer;
333 size, segl, seg2 , evcl , evc2 , cntr : integer;
334 arrayptr : messptr;
335 user :string8;
336 branch : integer;




340 result := 0;
341 {ensure no read up is allowed}
342 if sec_class.cx3mpromise[0] >= mhead. class. compromise [0] then
343 begin
344 if innotout then
345 user := mhead. reci
346 else
347 user := mhead. from;
348 case mhead. class. compromise [0] of
349 unclass_level : branch := useg;
350 conflevel : branch := cseg;
351 secret_level : branch := sseg;
352 t secret level : branch := tsseg;
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353 else result := 2;
354 end; {case}
355 if result = then
356 begin
357
358 getusernum (user , usernum, result)
;
359 mclass := init. resources.max_class;
360 seg_makeknown (init . initial_seg [ 2 ] ,branch , segl
,
361 r_w, size, sec_class , result)
;
362 showerrCread file make known result 1 = * , result) ;
363
364 segjnakeknown (segl,usernum,seg2,
365 r_w, size,mclass, result)
;
366 showerrCread file make known result 2 = ', result)
;
367
368 swapin_segment (seg2 , result)
;
369 show_err ( ' read file swapin result = ', result);
370
371 repeat
372 read_evc (seg2 , evcl , result)
;
373 arrayptr := lib_mk_pntr(ldt_table,seg2,l)
;
374 if innotout then
375 message := arrayptr* [messnum]
376 else
377 message := arrayptr* [messnum + 9];
378 read_evc (seg2 , evc2 , result)
379 until evcl = evc2;
380
381 segjterminate (seg2, result )
;
382








391 PROCEDURE readheader(user:string8; innotout:boolean;
392 access : accessclass ; VAR headerarrayrtheaderarray;
393 Var result: integer)
;
394 var
395 segl, seg2, evcl, evc2,cntr, size : integer;
396 arrayptr : headptr;
397 mclass : access_class;




402 (*putln(w_dev, 'accessing the header array list') ;*)
403 getusernum (user , usernum , result)
404 mclass := init. resources.max class;
87
405 segjrakeknown (init . initial_seg [ 2 ] , headerseg , segl
,
406 r_w, size,mclass, result)
;




408 segjrakeknown(segl / usernum / seg2 /
409 r_w, size,mclass, result)
410 show_err( 'read header make known result 2 = ', result)
411 swapin_segment (seg2 , result)
;
412 showerrCread header swapin result = ' , result);
413 repeat
4 14 read_evc (seg2 , evcl , result)
;
415 arrayptr := lib_mk_pntr(ldt_table,seg2,l) ;
416 if innotout then
417 headerarray := arrayptrA . income
418 else
419 headerarray := arrayptrA . outgo;
420 read_evc(seg2,evc2, result)
421 until evcl = evc2;
422
423 seg_terminate (seg2, result )
;
424 seg_terminate (segl, result)
425 for cntr := 1 to 9 do
426 if access. compromise [0] <
427 headerarray [cntr] . class . compromise [ ] then
428 with headerarray [cntr] do
429 begin
430 from := ' ' ;
431 reci := '
432 time := ' ' ;





438 PROCEDURE writeheader(user:string8; innotout:boolean;
439 access :access_class; header:messheading;messnum: integer;
440 Var result: integer)
;
441 var
442 size,usernum : integer;
443 segl, seg2, cntr, evcl : integer;
444 arrayptr : headptr;
445 mclass : access_class;
446 begin
447
448 (*putln(w_dev, 'accessing the header array list') ;*)
449 getusernum (user , usernum, result)
;
450 mclass := init. resources.max_class;
451 segjnakeknown ( init . initial_seg [ 2 ] , headerseg , segl
452 r_w, size,mclass, result)





456 r_w, size,mclass, result)
;
457 show_err('write header make known result 2 = ' , result)
;
458
459 swapin_segment (seg2 , result) ;
460 show_err( 'write header swapin result = ' , result);
461
462 ticket (seg2,evcl, result) ;
463 shcw_err('write header ticket result = ', result)
;
464 await (seg2 , evcl , result)
;
465 shcw_err( 'write header await result = ', result);
466 arrayptr := lib_mk_pntr(ldt_table,seg2,l)
;
467 header. class := access;
468 if innotout then
469 arrayptr^. income [messnum] := header
470 else
471 arrayptrA . outgo [messnum] := header;
472 advance (seg2 , result)
;
473 show_err( 'write header advance result = ' , result);
474
475 seg_terminate (seg2, result )
;
476








485 tempstr : string;
486
487 begin









496 case class. compromise [0] of
497 unclass_level : str := 'Unclassified';
498 confJLevel : str := 'Confidential';
499 secretlevel : str := 'Secret 1 ;










508 vstr : string;
509 strlen : integer;
510 begin
511 if ((0 < col) and (col <= 80) and
512 (1 <= row) and (row <= 24)) then
513 begin
514 vstr[l] := chr(27)
;
515 vstr [2] := '[';
516 strlen := 3;
517 if row > 9 then
518 begin
519 vstrfstrlen] := chr(48 + (row div 10));
520 strlen := 4;
521 end;
522 vstrfstrlen] := chr(48 + (row mod 10) ) ;
523 strlen := strlen + l;
524 vstrfstrlen] := ' ;
•
;
525 strlen := strlen + 1;
526 if col > 9 then
527 begin
528 vstr[strlen] := chr(48 + (col div 10));
529 strlen := strlen + 1;
530 end;
531 vstrfstrlen] := chr(48 + (col mod 10));
532 strlen := strlen + 1;
533 vstrfstrlen] := 'H';





538 vstr[0] := chr(l)
;









547 vstr : string;
548 cntr : integer;
549 begin
550






554 vstr[0] := chr(4)
;
555 vstr[l] := chr(27)
556 vstr [2] := '[';
557 vstr[3] := »2';







564 user : strings ;var choice : char) ;
565
566 { main menu screen }
567 var
568 headerarray : theaderarray;
569 innotout : boolean;
570 class_str: string;
571 cntr, result : integer;
572
573 begin






























































































C. Create a message')
;
E. Edit a message 1 )
;





S . Send a message
'
) ;
D. Delete a message')







'You have the following Messages: ')
;
























610 innotout := true;
611 Readheader (user , innotout , sec_class , headerarray , result)
;
612
613 for cntr := 1 to 9 do
614 begin
615 gotoxy (5, cntr + 15);
616 putchar (w_dev, headerarray [cntr] . charclass)
;
617 gotoxy (8, cntr + 15);
618 putstr (w_dev , headerarray [cntr] . from)
;
619 gotoxy ( 18 , cntr + 15 )
;
620 putstr (w_dev, headerarray [cntr] .time)
621 gotoxy (25, cntr + 15)




626 innotout := false;
627 Readheader (user, innotout, sec_class, headerarray, result)
628
629 for cntr := 1 to 9 do
630 begin
631 gotoxy (46, cntr + 15);
632 putchar (w_dev , headerarray [cntr ] . charclass )
;
633 gotoxy (51, cntr + 15)
634 putstr (w_dev ,headerarray [cntr ] . reci ) ;
635 gotoxy (62, cntr + 15)
636 putstr (w_dev, headerarray [cntr] .time)
637 gotoxy (70, cntr + 15);
638 putstr (w_dev,headerarray [cntr] .date)
639 end;
640






645 if ord (choice) > 96 then
646 choice := chr (ord (choice) - 32)
;
647 until (choice = 'C 1 ) or (choice = 'E') or
648 (choice = 'R') or (choice = 'S') or (choice = 'D')





654 FROCEDURE Selectfile (user:string8;sec_class:access_class;
655 innotout: boolean;VAR choice: char)
;
656 {from here the user selects on of the available of files}
657 var
658 headerarray : theaderarray;
659 cntr, result : integer;













































































0. No action 1 )
;
From To')
{read in the header file}
Readheader (user , innotout , sec_class , headerarray , result)
;




putchar(w_dev, headerarray [cntr] .charclass)
;
gotoxy(27,cntr + 5) ;
putstr (wjdev, headerarray [cntr] .from)
;
gotoxy(38,cntr + 5)
putstr (w_dev , headerarray [cntr ] . reci )
gotoxy(48,cntr + 5)
putstr (w_dev, headerarray [cntr] .time)
gotoxy(59,cntr + 5)








if (choice >= *1') and (choice <= '9') then
fileflag :=
headerarray [ord (choice) -48]. charclass <>
if choice = '0' then
fileflag := TRUE;




















715 str[l] := 'O 1 ;
716 if num >= 10 then
717 str[l] := chr(48 + (num div 10));
718 str[2] := chr(48 + (num mod 10));




723 PROCEDURE gettime(var time:string4;var date:string6) ;
724 const
725 clockslot = 5;
726 var
727 str : string;
728 result : integer;
729 clockbuff : od_tim_buff;
730 begin
731 cd_r_attach (clockslot, result)
;
732 cd_r_dev (clockslot, clockbuff, result)
;







737 int2str (clockbuff [ 3 ] , str)
738 time[3] := str[l];
739 time[4] :=str[2];








744 int2str (clockbuff [ 5 ] , str)
;
745 date[3] := str[l];
746 date[4] := str[2];
747 int2str (clockbuff [ 6 ] , str)






754 PROCEDURE deleteheader (user: string ;sec_class:Access_class;
755 availslot : integer ; innotout : boolean ;Var result : integer) ;
756 var
757 header : messheading;
758 begin
759 header. charclass := •*';
760 header. class. ccmpromise[0] := 0;
761 header. from := • ';
762 header. reci := ';
763 header. time := * '
;
764 header. date := ' '
;












773 message : messtext;
774 cntrl / cntr2: integer;
775 begin
776 with message.heading do
777 begin
778 charclass := '*•;
779 class. compromise [0] := 0;
780 if innotout then
781 begin
782 reci := user;




787 from := user;
788 reci := • •
;
789 end;
790 time := ' '
;
791 date := ' •;
792 end;
793 for cntrl := 2 to 23 do
794 for cntr2 := 1 to 80 do
795 message.body [cntrl, cntr2] := ' •;











804 innotout : boolean;
805 choice, yesno : char;
806 headerarray : theaderarray;
807 messnum, result : integer;




812 putstr(w_dev, 'Do you want to delete an ')
;
813 putstr(w_dev, 'incomming message? (Y/N) ');
814 getchar(r_dev,yesno)
;
815 putln(w_dev, ' •);
816 until yesno in [ 'y' , 'n' , 'Y' , 'N' ]
817 innotout := (yesno = 'Y') or (yesno = 'y');
95
818 Selectfile (user,sec_class / innotout, choice)
;
819 if choice <> '0' then
820 begin
821 messnum := ord (choice) - 48;
822 readneader (user, innotout / sec_class,headerarray, result)
;







827 putstr(w_dev, 'Is this the correct message? (Y/N) ');
828 getchar(r_dev,yesno)
;
829 putln(w_dev, ' •);
830 until yesno in [ 'y' , 'n' , 'Y' , 'N' ]
;
831 if yesno in ['y'/'Y'] then
832 begin
833 deleteheader (user , sec_class ,messnum , innotout , result) ;









842 innotout : boolean
843 Var availslot: integer)
844 var
845 cntr : integer;
846 headerarray ttheaderarray;
847 result : integer;
848 begin
849 readneader (user, innotout, sec_class, headerarray, result)
;
850 availslot := 1;
851 while (availslot < 9) and
852 (headerarry[availslot] .charclass <> '*') do
853 availslot := availslot + 1;




858 with headerarray [availslot] do
859 begin
860 class := sec_class;
861 case class. compromise [0] of
862 unclass level : charclass := •U'
863 conf level : charclass := C 1
864 secret level : charclass := •s 1
865 t_secret_level : charclass := llpl
866 else charclass := '*';
867 end;
868 from := user;
869 gettime (time , date)
96
870 end;
871 writeheader (user, innotout , sec_class
,






877 PROCEDURE createmess (user : string8;sec_class:access_class)
;
878 var
879 OTtrl,cntr2, availslot : integer;
880 innotout : boolean;
881 message : messtext;
882 yesno : char;




887 innotout := FALSE;
888 findheadslot (user, sec_class , innotout , availslot)
;
889 if availslot = then
890 begin
891 putstr(w_dev, 'There is no room in the header array for ')
;
892 putln(w_dev, 'any more messages')
;
893 putstr(w_dev, 'You must delete and/or send some
894 putln(w_dev / 'of them before')
;





899 updateheader (user , secclass ,message . heading , result)
900 for cntrl := 2 to 23 do
901 for cntr2 := 1 to 80 do







907 putstr(w_dev, 'Do you want to save the message? (Y/N) ')
908 getchar(r_dev, yesno)
;
909 putln(w_dev, ' ');
910 until yesno in [ 'Y' , 'N' , 'y' , 'n']
911 if (yesno = 'Y') or (yesno = 'y') then
912 begin
913 updateheader (user, secclass,message.heading, result)
;
914 writeheader (user, innotout, sec_class, message. heading,
915 availslot, result)
;













925 FEOCEDUEE <±Lspmessage (messin:Messtext) ;
926 var
927 cntrl , cntr2 : integer
;
928 secstring : string;
929 message : messtext;
930
931 begin
932 message := messin;
933
934 clrscr;
935 write_comp (message. heading. class, secstring)
;
936 putstr (w_dev , secstring)
;
937 gotoxy (25,1);
938 putstr (w_dev ,message . heading . frem)
;
939 gotoxy(35,l) ;
940 putstr (w_dev, message. heading. reci)
941 gotoxy(45,l) ;






946 for cntrl := 2 to 23 do
947 begin
948 for cntr2 := 1 to 79 do
949 putchar (w_dev ,message . body [cntrl , cntr2 ] )
;








957 PROCEDURE disp2 (messin:messtext) ;
958 var
959 secstring : string;
960 begin
961
962 write_comp (messin. heading. class, secstring)
;
963 putstr (w_dev , secstring)
964 gotoxy (25,1)
965 putstr (w_dev ,messin .heading . from) ;
966 gotoxy (35,1)
967 putstr (w_dev, messin. heading. reci)
968 gotoxy (45,1)
969 putstr (w_dev,messin.heading. time)
970 gotoxy (55,1)






976 PROCEDURE readiness (user : string8 ; sec_class : access_class)
;
977 const
978 innotout = TRUE;
979 var
980 choice : char;
981 headerarray : theaderarray;
982 messnum, result : integer;
983 message : messtext;
984 begin
985 Selectfile (user, secjclass, innotout, choice)
;
986 if choice <> '0' then
987 begin
988 messnum := ord (choice) - 48;
989 readheader (user, innotout , sec_class,headerarray , result)
;




992 if result <> then
993 begin
994 clrscr;















1008 var headerrec:messheading;var result : integer)
;
1009 var
1010 tempstr : string;
1011 cntr : integer;
1012 clockbuff : cd_tim_buff;
1013 begin
1014 with headerrec do
1015 begin
1016 class := secclass;
1017 case class. compromise [0] of
1018 unclasslevel : charclass := 'U'
1019 conflevel : charclass := 'C;
1020 secret_level : charclass := 'S';
1021 t_secret_level : charclass := "I"
1022 else charclass := '*';
1023 end;
1024 from := user;
99
1025 gettime (time, date)
;
1026 putstr(w_dev, 'Name of person to send message to ? ')
;






1032 PROCEDURE edit(var message : messtext) ;
1033 var
1034 inchar : char;




1039 linecntr := 2;
1040 colcntr := 1;
1041 repeat
1042 getchar (r_dev , inchar)
;
1043 charnum := ord(inchar)
;
1044 if charnum in [32.. 126] then
1045 (Normal Charcaters}
1046 begin
1047 if (linecntr = 23) and (colcntr = 80) then
1048 putchar (wjdev , chr (7 )
)
1049 else
1050 if (colcntr = 80) then
1051 begin
1052 putchar (w_dev, inchar)
;
1053 message.body [linecntr, colcntr] := inchar;
1054 linecntr := linecntr + 1;
1055 colcntr := 1;





1060 putchar (w_dev, inchar)
1061 message, body [linecntr, colcntr] := inchar;




1066 case charnum of
1067 {Cursor Movement}
1068 {up ,,AE")
1069 5 : begin
1070 if linecntr = 2 then
107
1
putchar (w_dev , chr (7 )
1072 else
1073 begin
1074 linecntr := linecntr - 1;





1079 24 : begin
1080 if linecntr = 23 then




1084 linecntr := linecntr + 1;





1089 19, 8 : begin
1090 if (linecntr = 2) and (colcntr = 1) then
1091 putchar (w_dev, chr (7)
)
1092 else
1093 if (colcntr = 1) then
1094 begin
1095 linecntr := linecntr - 1;
1096 colcntr := 80;





1101 colcntr := colcntr - 1;
1102 gotoxy (colcntr, linecntr)
1103 end;
1104 end •
1105 {right "AD" }
1106 4 : begin
1107 if (linecntr = 23) and (colcntr = 80) then
1108 putchar (w_dev , chr (7 )
1109 else
1110 if (colcntr = 80) then
1111 begin
1112 linecntr := linecntr + 1;
1113 colcntr := 1;





1118 colcntr := colcntr + 1;
1119 gotoxy (colcntr, linecntr)
1120 end;
1121 end;
1122 {Carrage return ,,AM", or the "return" key}
1123 13 : begin
1124 if linecntr = 23 then
1125 putchar (w_dev , chr (7 )
1126 else
1127 begin
1128 linecntr := linecntr + 1;
101
1129 colcntr := 1;
1130 gotoxy (cxdcntr, linecntr) ;
1131 end;
1132 end;
1133 {Start of line " AA"}
1134 1 : begin
1135 colcntr := 1;
1136 gotoxy (colcntr , 1inecntr ) ;
1137 end;
1138 {End of line " AF")
1139 6 : begin
1140 colcntr := 80;
114
1
gotoxy (colcntr , 1inecntr)
;
1142 end;
1143 {Top of page "AR"}
1144 18 : begin
1145 linecntr := 2;
1146 gotoxy (colcntr , 1inecntr)
1147 end;
1148 {Bottom of Page " AC"}
1149 3 : begin
1150 linecntr := 23;
1151 gotoxy (colcntr, linecntr)
1152 end;
1153 {Tab, five spaces " AI", or the "tab" key}
1154 9 : begin
1155 if colcntr < 75 then
1156 begin
1157 colcntr := colcntr + 5;





1162 {insert " AV"}
1163 22 : begin
1164 gotoxy (70,1);
1165 putstr (w_dev , ' INSERT ON ) ;
1166 gotoxy (colcntr, linecntr) ;
1167 getchar (r_dev , inchar )
;
1168 charnum := ord( inchar)
;
1169 while charnum in [32.. 126] do
1170 begin
1171 if (colcntr < 80) then
1172 begin
1173 for cntr := 79 downto colcntr do
1174 message. body[linecntr, cntr + 1] :=
1175 message.body[linecntr, cntr]
;
1176 message. body [linecntr, colcntr] := inchar;
1177 for cntr := colcntr to 80 do
1178 putchar (w_dev
,
1179 message . body [ 1inecntr , cntr] )
;
102






1185 putchar (wjdev, jjichar)
;
1186 message.body[linecntr, colcntr] := inchar;
1187 inchar := chr(27) ; {exit}
1188 end;
1189 getchar (rdev , inchar)
;
1190 charnum := ord( inchar)
1191 end;
1192 gotoxy (70,1);
1193 putstr(w_dev, • ');




1197 (Delete single character "AG"}
1198 7 : begin
1199 for cntr := colcntr to 79 do
1200 begin
1201 message.body [linecntr, cntr] :=
1202 message,body[linecntr, cntr + 1] ;
1203 putchar (w_dev ,message .body [ 1inecntr , cntr ] )
;
1204 end;
1205 message.body[linecntr, 80] :=' *
;
1206 putstr(w_dev, ' ');
1207 gotoxy (colcntr, linecntr)
;
1208 end;
1209 {Delete Line » AY"}
1210 25 : begin
1211 colcntr := 1;
1212 gotoxy (colcntr , 1inecntr)
1213 for cntr := linecntr to 22 do
1214 begin
1215 message.body [cntr] := message.body [cntr+1]
1216 for cntr2 := 1 to 80 do
1217 putchar (w_dev ,message .body [cntr , cntr2 ] ) ;
1218 end;
1219 for cntr2 := 1 to 80 do
1220 begin
1221 message.body[23,cntr2]:= •;
1222 putstr(w_dev, • ');
1223 end;




1227 {Exit edit mode ,,AZ"}
1228 26 : {exit};











1238 PROCEDURE editmessage(user:str:mg8;sec_class:access_class) ;
1239 const
1240 innotout = FALSE;
1241 var
1242 choice, yesno : char;
1243 headerarray : theaderarray;
1244 messnum, result : integer;
1245 message ; messtext;
1246 begin
1247 Selectfile (user, sec_class, innotout, choice)
;
1248 if choice <> '0' then
1249 begin
1250 messnum := ord (choice) - 48;
1251 readheader (user, innotout, sec_class , headerarry , result)
;
1252 readfile ( innotout , sec_class ,messnum,
1253 headerarray [messnum] ,message , result)
;
1254 if result <> then
1255 begin
1256 clrscr;
















1268 until yesno in [ 'Y' , 'N' , 'y' , 'n']
;
1269 if (yesno = 'Y') or (yesno = 'y') then
1270 begin
1271 updateheader (user, sec_class
,
1272 headerarray[messnum] , result)
;






1276 writefile ( innotout , sec_class ,messnum,









1284 PROCEDURE show_err(str: string; code : integer)
;
1285 begin {show_err}
1286 if code <> no_error then
1287 begin
1288 putstr (w_dev , str)
;
1289 putstr (w_dev, ' ');
1290 putdec(w_dev / ccde)
;




1295 begin {******************** MAIN *************************
}
1296 (* the port number is passed in from the SMSMAIN program*)
1297 portno := init.reserved[0]
;
1298 minclass := init. resources.min_class;
1299 maxclass := init. resources.max_class;
1300 trycntr := 0;
1301 while trycntr < 3 do
1302 begin
1303 userclass := maxclass;
1304 clrscr;
1305 userlcgin (user, userclass ,1113x01333, portno, result) ;
1306 if result = then
1307 begin
1308 trycntr := 0;
1309 choice := ' '
;
1310 innotout := True;
1311 while choice <> 'Q' do
1312 begin
1313 mainscreen (userclass, user, choice)
;
1314 case choice of
1315 C 1 : begin
1316 createmess (user, userclass)
;
1317 end;
1318 'R' : begin
1319 readmess (user, userclass )
1320 end;
1321 'E' : begin
1322 editmessage (user, userclass)
;
1323 end;
1324 'S 1 : begin
1325 sendmess (user, userclass)
1326 end;
1327 'D' : begin
1328 deletemess (user,userclass)
1329 end;
1330 "Q 1 : begin




















1348 putln(w_dev, 'This terminal has been locked out due to too ')
1349 putln(w_dev, 'many wrong login/password attemps 1 )
;
1350 putln(w_dev, 'Notify the system manager for reactivation')
;
1351 putln(w_dev, 'Termination of Secure Mail System');
1352 detach ( w_dev ) ;
1353 detach ( r_dev );
1354 selfjdelete ( init . initial_seg [ ] , success )
;









SMS TYPE INCLUDE FILE
This file contains the type declarations that are
covered in Chapter IV.
string4 = string[4];















body : array [2. .23,1. .80] of char;
end;
theaderarray = array [1.. 9] of messheading;
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